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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the denial of a petition for post conviction
relief following an evidentiary hearing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The facts and background of the underlying criminal case were succinctly
explained in the published opinion of the direct appeal of a co-defendant, State
v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22 (Ct.App. 2009):

On January 24, 2006, three masked men wearing dark clothing,
one with a blue bandana, entered the Lotus Garden restaurant
brandishing firearms. They demanded money from the owner,
Hong Ha, and Ha's daughter, Karen, and threatened to shoot them
if they did not comply. When the men realized that Hong's wife was
on the telephone with the police in another portion of the restaurant,
they fled the building, got into a white Pontiac Grand Prix, and sped
away.
The police soon located the automobile, and a high-speed chase
ensued during which one or more of the Pontiac's occupants shot
at the pursuing officers. The chase ended when the Pontiac's driver
lost control and drove into an irrigation canal. The vehicle
occupants fled on foot and avoided immediate apprehension. A
short time later, however, Keith Ogburn was found lying in a field
and was taken into custody. Johnny Gonzalez was arrested after
he was discovered hiding in the weeds on the bank of the canal. He
was sporting a blue bandana around his neck. About two and onehalf hours after the search was initiated, Gerardo was seen walking
down a residential street near the crash scene and was also
arrested. All three of the men were wearing dark clothing and were
cold, muddy and wet from the waist down.
The three men were indicted for burglary, Idaho Code section 181401, and attempted robbery, I.C. §§ 18-6501, -306, and the
indictment sought an enhancement of their burglary sentences for
use of a firearm in the course of that crime, I.C. § 19-2520. The
three men were tried together and none of them testified.
Id., at p. 24 (footnote omitted).
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Mr. Ogburn was convicted and sentenced to 30 years fixed followed by 10
indeterminate, which after a ruling in Gerardo, supra, was reduced to 17 ½ years
fixed followed by 7 ½ years indeterminate consecutive to an Indiana state
sentence. (R. p. 147.) He pursued a direct appeal, which was unsuccessful. (R.
p. 19.)

Then, as explained in the Memorandum Decision in the instant case, Mr.
Ogburn initially filed a pro se petition for post conviction relief.

(R. p. 190.)

Counsel was appointed, who ultimately was allowed to file a second amended
petition. (R. p. 190.) An evidentiary hearing was conducted, and then several
months later pursuant to Petitioner's request, the case was reopened to take
additional testimony. (R. p. 191.)
The district court denied post conviction relief.
(R. p. 201-202.)
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Petitioner timely appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the district court erred when it denied post conviction relief after an
evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner's assertions that he had received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
RELIEF

FOLLOWING

AN

WHEN IT DENIED

EVIDENTIARY

POST CONVICTION

HEARING,

REJECTING

PETITIONER'S ASSERTIONS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A.

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
The relevant standards were comprehensively explained in Medina v.

State, 132 Idaho 722, 979 P.2d 124 (Ct.App. 1999):

In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Fol/inus
v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995); see also
I.C. § 19-4907 (stating that all rules and statutes applicable in civil
proceedings are available to the parties in a postconviction relief
case). Once the district court has denied or granted the post
conviction application following a hearing, the evidence must be
viewed most favorably to the trial court's findings. Reynolds v.
State, 126 Idaho 24, 28, 878 P.2d 198,202 (Ct. App. 1994).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all
matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v.
State, 115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1988). On appeal,
findings of fact made by the trial court shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52 (a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65,
794 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1990). Findings supported by competent
and substantial evidence produced at the hearing will not be
disturbed. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P.2d 642,
644 (Ct. App. 1995). However, this Court freely reviews the legal
conclusions drawn by the trial court from the facts found. Id.
Id. at p. 724-725.
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8.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).

The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." Id. at 686.
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in
order to be entitled to relief.

The defendant must demonstrate both that his

counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau,
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).

C.

The Evidentiary Hearing and the Court's Rulings
Two main claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were tried at the

evidentiary hearing.

First, Petitioner asserted that his attorney, who is now

disbarred, did not investigate or present Petitioner's alibi defense. In short,
Petitioner asserted that the reason he was found in the same field as the codefendant was because after a graduation ceremony in Nampa, he had gotten
into an argument with his girlfriend who threatened to call his parole officer and
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the police,

got upset, left, got high, and inadvertently stumbled into the field

where he passed out and was found by police.
Second, Petitioner asserted that his attorney failed to impeach codefendant Johnny Gonzalez's girlfriend, Rose Torres, when she testified at trial
that she had eaten dinner with Johnny Gonzalez and Mr. Ogburn at the
restaurant in question earlier the day of the attempted robbery at around 5 P.M.
The attorney's failings here were twofold; the attorney did not impeach Rose
Torres with her original statement to the police where she said she didn't know
Mr. Ogburn, and also, the attorney did not call witnesses who would have
testified that he was with them at that time. 1
The district court issued a lengthy decision which described the
evidentiary hearing. 2 Petitioner will first detail the court's decision which goes
over much of what happened at the hearing, and then in the section below,
Petitioner will provide more detail which the court omitted.
The Petitioner's first claim deals exclusively with his assertion that
his counsel, Mr. Mark McHugh, did not investigate, disclose, nor
present an alibi defense on behalf of the Petitioner. The Petitioner
disputes that he in fact told his counsel that he was present during
the alleged crime. Petitioner now claims that he was attending a
graduation ceremony in Nampa at or near the time of the crime.
The Petitioner also now offers an alternative explanation as to why
he was found in the same field as the co-defenants.

1

Petitioner also raised an issue about the failure of trial counsel to object to a
police officer's testimony regarding the content of his interview with co-defendant
Johnny Gonzalez, but this is not being pursued in this appeal.
2
Actually, the district court's Memorandum Decision appears to largely be a
verbatim repetition of the state's written closing argument. (R. p. 181-186.)
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The first area that the Court will focus upon is the testimony of Mark
McHugh, the Petitioner's attorney during the trial in this case.
Mr. McHugh testified on December 29, 2009. Earlier, the Court had
required Mr. McHugh to post bail because the parties had not been able
to locate him for purposes of subpoenaing him into court. Mr. McHugh
posted a witness bail and testified in these proceedings. It should also
be noted that during the course of the hearing, it was presented to the
Court that Mr. McHugh had been suspended from the practice of law.
Trial counsel Mark McHugh was questioned both by the Petitioner and
by the Court regarding his disbarment. Mr. McHugh answered candidly
and truthfully about the reason and timing of the bar disciplinary action
against him. His testified that the disbarment was recent in time and
that the underlying difficulties of depression began long after the
Petitioner's case. Mr. McHugh indicated that he was not suffering from
depression back in 2006 when the Petitioner's case went to trial.
There is neither credible testimony nor any evidence before the Court to
the contrary that Mr. McHugh was impaired during the time period he
represented the Petitioner.
Mr. McHugh testified that the Petitioner had admitted to him in the course
of the attorney client relationship that he had been present at the
restaurant that is the subject of this attempted robbery and burglary.
The Court, during the course of observing Mr. McHugh and evaluating
his testimony, found that he had an independent recollection of his
contact with Mr. Ogburn and that he had accurate knowledge of his
conversations with Mr. Ogburn. The Court will further find that Mr.
McHugh's credibility in this matter is far more credible than the
testimony that was presented by Mr. Ogburn. In his testimony, Mr.
McHugh summarized that he had met with Mr. Ogburn approximately
ten to fifteen times in addition to talking to him on the telephone. Mr.
McHugh testified clearly and succinctly that Mr. Ogburn had made
admissions to him that after a graduation ceremony, he had gotten
together with Johnny Gonzales and Frank Gerardo, the co-defendants,
and that they were going to look for some drugs. Ogburn admitted to Mr.
McHugh details of the attempted robbery and burglary in the course of
their conversations. Additionally, the defendant admitted his
presence at the crime not only to his counsel, but also to Special
Agent Johansson in an interview at the Canyon County jail very shortly
after the Petitioner was apprehended.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Petitioner did not
make these admissions other than the Petitioner's denial made
some three years later in this proceeding. Special Agent
Johansson testified under oath to the context and content of
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the admissions made by the Petitioner. His testimony was reflective of
the information he documented in his report following this interview
of the Petitioner. A true and accurate copy of the report was provided
in discovery and was known to Mr. McHugh and the Petitioner. Mr.
McHugh testified that he was aware of not only his client's
admissions to Special Agent Johansson, but also believed, based on
the Petitioner's statements to him, that the defendant was present and
involved in this crime.
To present an alibi defense contradicting these clear admissions
would have required Mr. McHugh to suborn perjury or at least elicit
testimony that he believed to be untrue. Had Mr. McHugh placed an
alibi defense at issue, then the statements made to Agent Johansson
would have been admitted into evidence at trial. Whether for reason of
Miranda violation or claims of involuntary statements made
during custodial interrogation, the statements would still be
admissible for impeachment of the Petitioner.
The Petitioner engages in speculation and conjectures about Mr.
McHugh's truthfulness and recollection of the events and asks this Court
to take the Petitioner's word now looking back in retrospect. "Because of
the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that
counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance- that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" [citations omitted]
The Petitioner correctly states in his supplemental closing that "If
Petitioner did admit his involvement then Mr. McHugh's performance
would be understandable." The Petitioner concedes that if the
Petitioner's admissions are true, his counsel Mr. McHugh would be
ethically barred from presenting a defense that he knows is not true. The
only contention now four years later is that this Court should supplant the
Petitioner's self-serving version for that counsel's sworn testimony.
The Petitioner's "alibi" defense was not an option for trial counsel to
present to the jury because although the Petitioner had been at the
He
graduation, he was at the graduation prior to these crimes.
was not at the graduation when the crimes occurred at the Lotus
Garden restaurant. Petitioner told the police that he did not know
"Johnny" (trial transcript at 684, lines 23-25; at 685-86, lines 25 & lines 14). Yet, Petitioner told trial counsel, among other things, that he had in
fact met up with Johnny and Frank after the graduation ceremony and
after he had left his girlfriend and that he had been in the vehicle with
Johnny and Frank when they all went to the Lotus Garden restaurant;
that he had been in the parking lot of the Lotus Garden restaurant when
the crimes occurred and that he had been in the vehicle with the co-
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defendants when police pursued it and when it crashed in the field. Trial
counsel did not have an alibi defense to present because not only did
the evidence at trial establish that the police found him in the field with
the co-defendants, but based upon what the Petitioner told his trial
counsel, he was with the co-defendants after the graduation. While the
State may have made a tactical decision not to present these
admissions by the defendant for fear of a violation of the defendant's
right to counsel, they would in any event be available for impeachment.
What Petitioner told his trial counsel was different than what he told
the police and therefore, counsel in consultation with Petitioner, made
the decision to present a defense consistent with what Petitioner told the
police. To do otherwise, would have permitted the State to portray the
Petitioner as untruthful as he had lied to the police about not knowing
Johnny. In addition, based upon what Petitioner told
counsel,
Petitioner would have been placed not only in the vehicle, but
knowing the co-defendants; being at the Lotus Garden crime scene
and being with them during the police chase and subsequent crash.
Further, trial counsel could not put the Petitioner on the witness stand
because he would have been subject to impeachment based on
Petitioner's prior Robbery conviction out of Indiana. In addition, trial
counsel had to be cautious not to open the door to a subsequent
interview by the police of co-defendant Gonzales who directly
implicated Petitioner in the crimes.

With respect to counsel's failure to use a prior statement by witness
Rosie Torres as impeachment, the record of the case and the police
report admitted during the evidentiary do not show any inconsistency.
The Petitioner's argument relates to the trial counsel's strategy in
conducting cross-examination of the witness, not simply the failure to
object to hearsay. This issue was not raised in the Petitioner's Second
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and is therefore
procedurally barred from consideration.
Decision, p. 4-9. (R. p. 193-198.)
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D.

The Court Erred in Denying Post Conviction Relief
Many things are wrong about the court's decision. They are best show

by simply describing the details from the evidentiary hearing omitted from the
court's order and then explaining how this evidence effects the court's findings
and conclusions.

But Appellant will begin with an instance of clear error where

the court's decision simply got wrong what

evidence was presented at the

hearing.
Regarding the testimony of trial counsel Mark McHugh, the decision is
incorrect, Mr. McHugh never testified about the reason and timing of his
disbarment.

Mr. McHugh simply denied that his disbarment was related to the

representation of Mr. Ogburn; denied that his disbarment resulted from mental
health or substance abuse issues; and denied that there was anything in the
period of time that he represented Mr. Ogburn that impaired his ability to practice
law, whether it be substance abuse or mental health issues. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p.
30, 75.)
Thus, the court's findings that Mr. McHugh testified about the reasons and
timing of his disbarment are clear error since he did not testify as to them, nor to
the specific things that the court believed he did, such

his depression. Also,

since the court was incorrect about what the evidence was, it was likewise
incorrect in its conclusion that Mr. McHugh answered candidly and truthfully
about the reason and timing of the bar disciplinary action against him since he
never testified about it.
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As to the testimony regarding Mr. McHugh's trial strategy, some of the
significant portions of his testimony not discussed by the court follow:
Mr. McHugh did not recall discussing with Mr. Ogburn's mother, sister or
girlfriend whether they would be testifying. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 33-35.) He was
aware early on in the representation of the graduation ceremony alibi defense
(Mr. Ogburn and his family were at a graduation ceremony for the Young Marines
in Nampa) but did not give a notice of alibi to the prosecutor because he had not
been provided with the evidentiary backup, to wit, a photograph of Mr. Ogburn at
the graduation and a sign-in sheet. 3 (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 35-36.)
Mr. McHugh did not contact any witnesses regarding the defense,
although discussed it with Mr. Ogburn's girlfriend, Chi Maestas. (Tr. 12/29/2009,
p. 37.) He did not recall ever hearing the name Elaine Salinas (who was Chi's
roommate and testified at the evidentiary hearing that she saw Chi and Mr.
Ogburn arguing after the graduation ceremony at their (Chi and Elaine's) home).
(Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 37.) He did not recall ever interviewing Rose Marie Torres,
co-defendant Johnny Gonzalez's girlfriend. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 39-40.)
McHugh testified that it was agreed between him and Mr. Ogburn that the
defense strategy was to stick with the story he had originally told police, which
was he got in an argument with his girlfriend, got upset, left, got high, and
inadvertently wandered into the field where he passed out and was found by
3

The Memorandum Decision states that Petitioner now claims that he was that
he was attending a graduation and also now offers an alternative explanation as
to why he was found in the field. However, Mr. McHugh's testimony made it
clear that these are not recent inventions as suggested by the Memorandum
Decision's use of the word "now." Mr. Ogburn always made these claims, they
were just never presented by his attorney.
11

police. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 45-47.)

McHugh testified that he recalled that Chi

Maestas corroborated the fact that they had an argument that night, as well as
that he was at the graduation. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 47-48.) However, he did not
disclose Ms. Maestas as a witness nor call her as a witness at trial. (Tr.
12/29/2009, p. 48.)

Mr. McHugh testified that Mr. Ogburn never demanded that

she testify. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 48, 50.)
Mr. McHugh testified that the strategy was also to distance Mr. Ogburn
from the Lotus Garden restaurant. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 41-42, 49-50.) However,
Rose Torres (Johnny Gonzalez's girlfriend) testified that she had dinner at the
Lotus Garden with Johnny Gonzalez and Mr. Ogburn earlier on the day in
question even though when originally interviewed by police, she denied knowing
Mr. Ogburn.

Mr. Hugh admitted he did not cross examine Ms. Torres on this

point. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 42-43.)
The court also questioned Mr. McHugh about this. The court asked Mr.
McHugh if he had been aware that Ms. Torres ever denied knowing Mr. Ogburn,
would he have cross examined her on that point. Mr. McHugh testified he wasn't
sure because Ms. An Ha (restaurant owner's wife) testified she saw the three of
them (Rose, who worked there, Johnny and Mr. Ogburn) at the restaurant earlier.
Also, he would have had to potentially call Johnny to verify one way or the other,
and he would have to call Mr. Ogburn to the stand as well. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p.
78.) So his answer was yes and no, but he concluded that he didn't feel it was
advantageous to cross examine her on that. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 78.)
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On cross examination (by the prosecutor), Mr. McHugh testified that they
decided to stick with the strategy that kept Mr. Ogburn as far away from the Lotus
Garden as possible, and this defense

would just be based on the statements

by Mr. Ogburn to the police and the chain of custody of the evidence recovered.
(Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 69-70.)
The next witness called was Detective Mark Taylor, who was the police
officer who interviewed Mr. Ogburn

after he was arrested. Detective Taylor

testified that Mr. Ogburn made some comment about being high. (Tr. 12/29/2009,
p. 84-85.)

When his memory was refreshed from a police report, Detective

Taylor testified that Mr. Ogburn made no statement before invoking his right to an
attorney. 4 (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 85.)
Also called at the evidentiary hearing were multiple witnesses who would
each testify they were at the graduation ceremony with Mr. Ogburn. They were
Carol Fitzgerald (the teacher of Mr. Ogburn's brother); Chi Maestas (Mr.
Ogburn's girlfriend at the time of the offense but not by the time of the evidentiary
hearing); Tami Ogburn (Mr. Ogburn's sister), Crystal Ogburn (Tami's daughter);
and Jo Ellyn Ogburn (Mr. Ogburn's mother).

4

At trial, Detective Taylor testified that when asked how he came to be in the
field, Mr. Ogburn said he had been riding around getting high. (Trial Transcript,
p. 686-687.) Officer Orvis, who found Mr. Ogburn in the field, testified at trial
that when asked what was going on Mr. Ogburn was insistent he didn't know
and eventually told them he got high and woke up in the field. (Trial transcript, p.
419.)
Incidentally, the district court took judicial notice of the criminal case proceedings
{R. p. 101) and itself read from and cited to the trial transcript, which is an exl"libit
in this appeal. (R. p. 210.)

13

Some significant portions of their testimony follow: Chi Maestas testified
that Mr. McHugh said he would use them as witnesses, to wit, her, Mr. Ogburn's
sister and his mother, but he never did. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 101 .)

Jo Ellyn

Ogburn testified that Mr. McHugh told her she would be a witness (but she
wasn't called). (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 141-142.) Tami Ogburn complained to Mr.
McHugh that they were not being called as witnesses. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 169.)
Tami Ogburn also testified that Mr. Ogburn had been at her house
babysitting all day and was there when she got home about 4-4:30 P.M.; they
then had dinner and went to the graduation ceremony at sometime before 7
P.M., and

he stayed with her right through this time and did not leave. (Tr.

12/29/2009, p. 163-165, 173.) While Tami Ogburn was on the stand, the court
read the portion of the trial transcript where Rose Torres (Johnny's Gonzalez's
girlfriend) testified that at about 5 o clock of the day in question, she, Johnny
Gonzalez and Keith Ogburn were at the Lotus Garden having dinner. (Tr.
12/29/2009, p. 174-175.) Tami Ogburn testified at the evidentiary hearing that
when she heard this testimony at trial, she advised Mr. McHugh that Mr. Ogburn
was at her house and Rose Torres was lying. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 175-176.) She
asked Mr. McHugh why he didn't cross examine her and he said Johnny's lawyer
would do it. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 176.)
Finally, Tami's daughter, now 14, testified she remembered Mr. Ogburn
babysitting that day and being there during dinner. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 178-180.)
Chi Maestas had also testified that she took Mr. Ogburn over to Tami's house
earlier in the day to baby sit. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 102-103.)
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Some months after the close of the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner
requested the court reopen it so that the testimony of Mr. Ogburn could be
presented. Regarding Rose Torres, Mr. Ogburn testified that when he heard her
testify that he ate dinner at the Lotus Garden restaurant with her and Johnny
Gonzalez, he told Mr. McHugh she was lying and asked him to cross examine
her with the police report that they had (produced in discovery). (Tr. 4/8/2010, p.
29.) Mr. McHugh did not, however, advising that he would cross examine the
detective who interviewed her. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 29.)
The substance of that police report stated that Rose Torres did not know
Keith Ogburn. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 32.)

At trial she testified that she didn't know

him well, but had dinner with him at the Lotus Garden the day of the attempted
robbery. 5 (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 33.)
It was pointed out at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. McHugh was aware
of this inconsistency, because he tried to question Detective Taylor about
whether Rose Torres had early on denied knowing Mr. Ogburn, but the court
sustained the state's hearsay objection. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 33-34.)

Further, while

her testimony was before the jury, nothing was done to rebut it showing that Mr.
Ogburn didn't have

dinner at the Lotus Garden that day but had dinner at

Tami's. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 34.)

5

While the state and court claim that this is not an inconsistency, neither explain
just why it isn't (not knowing someone at all is different than not knowing them
well but well enough to have dinner with them), or more to the point, regardless
of the degree of inconsistency, why this would not be a valuable area of
impeachment in any event.
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On cross examination, the prosecutor stated they had never heard the
Rose Torres claim in any of his post-conviction petitions before and it's a new
allegation, to which Mr. Ogburn answered that is incorrect because it was in his
original petition. 6 (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 41.)

The prosecutor did not object to this

claim, but went on questioning Mr. Ogburn about it. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 42.)
To address the second claim first, the court in its decision is wrong about
the Rose Torres claim being procedurally defaulted because even if it did not
reappear in the second amended petition, it was tried by the implied consent of
the parties, as well as the court.
The relevant rule of civil procedure provides as follows:
Rule 15(b). Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails
to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon
the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
objecting party to meet such evidence.
I.R.C.P. Rule 15(b).

6

The state was in fact aware that this claim was in the original petition because
it had actually argued in its brief in support of its motion to dismiss that said
claim should fail inter alia, because counsel's manner of conducting cross
examination is a strategic decision. (R. p. 48.)
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In our case, the state did not object when the claim was brought up in
either the first portion of the evidentiary hearing or after it was later reopened.
The state had the opportunity to cross examine every witness who testified about
it and in fact cross examined Mr. Ogburn about it. Petitioner argued the issue in
his written closing and supplemental closing argument. (R. p. 163, 174-175.)
The state then had an opportunity to respond to the merits in its written closing
argument (filed after both of Petitioner's written closing arguments), but did not
The state cannot claim prejudice since it was actually aware of the original
claim and responded to it in its earlier briefing.

If the state, after hearing the

testimony about the claim at the first day of the evidentiary hearing desired to
produce evidence regarding it, it could have after the hearing was reopened.
Finally, since the court itself examined witnesses on the issue and was
instrumental in developing the evidence on it, Appellant asserts that under these
circumstances, it erred when it held

this claim

to be procedurally defaulted

because it was not raised in the second amended petition.
As to the merits of this claim, Appellant will begin with

Mr. McHugh's

failure to impeach Rose Torres with her prior inconsistent statement. This is not
a matter or second guessing counsel's strategic decisions, since Mr. McHugh
clearly knew it needed to be done, he just didn't know how to do it, which is
shown by his improper attempt to do so through Detective Taylor.
In Pratt (Joseph) v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 6 P.3d 831 (2000), the Idaho
Supreme Court held:
In addition, strategic and tactical decisions will not be second
guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim
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of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to
have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.
Id., p. 584.

Thus, since Mr. McHugh's failure to impeach Rose Torres with her prior
inconsistent statement was based on his ignorance of relevant law, it is not an
unreviewable tactical decision, but is a shortcoming capable of objective review.
Also capable of objective review are Mr. McHugh's stated reasons for not
impeaching her directly on cross examination with the prior inconsistent
statement. While Mr. McHugh claimed it would not have been advantageous to
do so, this is either disingenuous or shows his even further ignorance of relevant
law, as well as inadequate preparation.
The first of his supposed reasons for not cross examining Rose Torres
about her dinner with Johnny Gonzalez and Keith Ogburn, was that Ms. An Ha
had also testified that Mr. Ogburn had dinner with Johnny Gonzalez and Rose
Torres. But this is not true, the trial testimony shows she could not identify the
third person having dinner (and she testified immediately before Rose Torres).
(Trial transcript, p. 213-215.)
Second, Mr. McHugh was concerned that he would have to call Johnny
Gonzalez to the stand to verify Rose Torres' statement one way or the other.
This is of course not true and does not even make sense, he can still impeach
Rose Torres with her prior inconsistent statement without any need to call the codefendant in a criminal case, even assuming arguendo that he could do so. The
same is true as to his concern that he would have put Mr. Ogburn on the stand.
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He would not, again, she can be impeached without this other evidence being
introduced.
Moreover, there was other evidence available which was known to Mr.
McHugh which would have

impeached Rose Torres and

showed that Mr.

Ogburn could not have been having dinner with Rose Torres and Johnny
Gonzalez at the Lotus Garden about 5 o'clock that day. While presumably every
family member who testified at the evidentiary hearing could have also testified at
trial that Mr. Ogburn was at Tami Ogburn's house having dinner and was there
until they left for the graduation, we are certain that Tami could and she told Mr.
McHugh so.

Even if Mr. McHugh choose not to call the other witnesses

regarding the graduation ceremony because of the time gap between the end of
it and the attempted robbery, this same concern does not apply (nor do the
others) to the evidence that he was not at the Lotus Garden with Johnny
Gonzalez earlier on the day of the attempted robbery. 7
In short, Mr. McHugh's performance at the trial was deficient since he
lacked the basic legal knowledge of how to impeach a witness, and his later
explanations for why he did not show only a further lack of knowledge of both the
law and the evidence admitted at the trial.

Further, he did not put on other

evidence which would distance Mr. Ogburn from the Lotus Garden, even though

7

The same is true of a more minor point. Karen Ha (daughter of the owner of
the Lotus Garden), testified that at about 9 P.M., or approximately an hour before
the attempted robbery, she saw the same Grand Prix outside the restaurant.
Regardless of when exactly the graduation ended, it was clear that it was well
after 9 P.M., and so Mr. McHugh had evidence available to him which would
have rebutted the inference that Mr. Ogburn had been there earlier casing the
restaurant.
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that was Mr. McHugh's declared strategy and he was aware of the evidence.
Further, these failings prejudiced Mr. Ogburn. As he pointed out in his original
petition, the Rose Torres identification of him was the only evidence tying him to
either Johnny Gonzalez or the Lotus Garden, other than being found in the same
field later on, which is the next point addressed. (R. p. 27.)
To now discuss the first issue, which is the failure to investigate or present
an alibi defense, as

succinctly

argued by Petitioner in his written closing

argument:
Ogburn had multiple witnesses testify as to his potential alibi. Mr.
McHugh did not interview the individuals who testified at his evidentiary
hearing. His mother Jo Ellyn Ogburn testified he had attended his
brother's graduation from the Young Marines in Nampa. The ceremony
ran late. His sister Tami Ogburn testified he had watched her children
all day. He would not have had the opportunity to be at the Lotus
Garden earlier that day. He was also present for dinner. Carol
Fitzgerald Ogburn's brother's teacher recalled him being present for
the entirety of the ceremony and it running late. Crystal Ogburn is his
niece. She remembers him watching her.
Ogburn's most compelling witness was Chi Maestas. She testified what
happened after the graduation. She offered an alternative theory as to
why Ogburn would be in the field hiding from the police. She knew he
was on parole and threatened to call his parole officer. She knew he
was using methamphetamine. They had just been in an animated
argument.
Ms. Maestas made multiple attempts to contact Mr. McHugh, but was
never interviewed about her version of the night's events. Elaine
Salina corroborated the presence of Ogburn in the trailer and the fight
with Ms. Maestas. Karen Ha, an eye witness to the crime, testified the
restaurant was approached by the assailants at ten o'clock p.m. (Trial
transcript, Page 108, L. L. 8-25) If Ms. Maestas is to be believed it
would have been impossible for Ogburn to be present at the crime
scene. (R. 163-164.)
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine and Written Closing Argument, at p.
5-6. (R. p. 163-164.)
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Regardless of the defense the court decided that Mr. McHugh could not
put on, it is clear is that the defense strategy that Mr. McHugh and Mr. Ogburn
agreed upon was not followed. The court found, based on the testimony of Mr.
McHugh, that counsel would present a defense consistent with what Petitioner
had told the police. That story was, as Mr. McHugh repeatedly testified, that Mr.
Ogburn got in an argument with his girlfriend, got upset, left, got high, and
inadvertently wandered into the field where he passed out and was found by
police. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 45-47.)

And as established by the prosecution on

cross examination, Mr. McHugh intended to establish that defense just based on
the statements of Mr. Ogburn to the police (and chain of custody issues). (Tr.
12/29/2009, p. 69-70.)
The problem with Mr. McHugh's plan is that Mr. Ogburn never told that
story to police.

This was made clear by Detective Taylor's testimony at the

evidentiary hearing, as well as the trial testimony described above. So what the
jury heard was not that Mr. Ogburn got into an argument with his girlfriend, got
upset, left, got high, and inadvertently stumbled into the field where he passed
out.

Instead, the jury heard that Mr. Ogburn was riding around getting high

and also, he got high and woke up in the field.
The full version that the jury did not hear provides an alternate theory of
why he was in the field, which if believed by the jury, would result in his acquittal.
While this is true even without the proper impeachment of Rose Torres, it is of
course a much stronger defense where any link is broken between Mr. Ogburn
and the restaurant and/or Johnny Gonzalez. The abbreviated version the jury did
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hear, however, even if believed by the jury, does not actually provide a defense.
In other words, riding around getting high and/or passing out in the field is not
inconsistent with first attempting to rob a restaurant, and some might argue, is
perfectly consistent with it.
Thus, the issue is not as addressed by the district court, which is that Mr.
McHugh could not present the alibi defense without essentially suborning perjury
or at least evidence he believed to be untrue.

Rather, the issue

is that Mr.

McHugh told Mr. Ogburn he would be presenting the agreed upon defense
(which is an alibi defense because it was based on him not being at the robbery),
and then didn't do so. The defense he pursued made no sense and actually was
not a defense to the crime. Appellant asserts that this was objectively deficient
performance that prejudiced him.
In addition, Mr. Ogburn was asked at one point by the prosecutor whether
he studied the reports to see what things could have been done differently. He
answered no, and that he is alleging that nothing was done the way he wanted it
done. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 38-39.) While obviously an expression of frustration by
the Petitioner to a semi-facetious question, it is emblematic of the case. Again,
the defense put on by Mr. McHugh, to wit, that Mr. Ogburn was riding around
getting high, is actually not a defense since even if true it is not a reason he can
be found not guilty.
Given this,

Petitioner asserts that the correct standard is actually not that

of Strickland, but rather the presumption of prejudice established in United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).

In Cronic, the Supreme Court held that "if
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counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the
adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." Id. at 659.
Finally, regarding the credibility determinations of the court, even though
they are generally the sole province of the district court, some comments are in
order. First, as explained above, the court found that Mr. McHugh testified
"truthfully and candidly" about something he did not testify about, and so the
court's determinations are suspect to begin with .
Additionally, the record belies several of Mr. Hugh's claims. In other
words, it is not a matter of which witness to believe, but rather, the trial transcript
itself shows that Mr. McHugh was wrong. The most important example is that
Mr. Ogburn did not tell the police that he had gotten in an argument with his
girlfriend, got upset, left, got high, and inadvertently stumbled into the field where
he passed out.

Therefore , Mr. McHugh could not have based that defense on

this information coming in through the police. And the court did not have to scour
the record to determine this,

it was established via Detective Taylor at the

evidentiary hearing .8
Despite all of this, the court simply finds that Mr. McHugh is the credible
one,

ignoring that the record proves him incredible, the other witnesses

dispute his testimony, and the rather remarkable fact of his disbarment.

8

Another example was that Ms. An Ha did not identify Mr. Ogburn so that could
not be a reason Mr. McHugh did not cross examine Rose Torres, although this
does not appear to have been brought out at the evidentiary hearing .
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore,

for the

reasons

as

stated

above,

Appellant/Petitioner

respectfully requests that the district court's denial of post conviction relief be

/)
reversed and that this Court vacate his convictions.
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